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EFFECT OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA AND TPLF IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA

(2020-2022)

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Map 1: Conflict Location and Battle Front Line in early first phase of the conflict

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACLDE	Armed Conflict Location Data Event
AU	African Union
CRS	Congressional Research Service
EDS	Ethiopia Diasporas Services
EDF	Eritrean Defense Force
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EU	European Union
IFA	Institute of Foreign Affairs
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
TDF	Tigray Defense Force
TPLF	Tigray people Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirate
UN	United Nation
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSCR	UN-Security Council Report
US	United State of America
US-EU	United State of America and European Union coalition.

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Abstract

The main aim of this study was to explore the effects of external intervention on the course of the northern Ethiopia conflict. After the war started on November 4, 2020, various external actors participated directly or indirectly through diplomatic and military way. The finding of the research showed that the motives or interest of the intervened actors in the Ethiopia conflict was to safeguard their and their allies' national interest on the HOA and Ethiopia. In order to achieve this interest, some of them supported TPLF and others supported the federal government of Ethiopia directly as well as indirectly. They used the strategies providing modern military equipments such as drone, and satellite communication materials. Also, they used humanitarian organization and aid workers, and international media Journalists as a tool to reach their biased warring parties. Generally, both the military and diplomatic role and the interest of these actors lead to prolong the duration and the intensity (level) of the northern Ethiopian conflict to end as well as it changed military outcome and the type of warfare from convectional to guerilla, and vise verse. The intervened actors in peace process and to end ceasefire were not aligning with the assumed outcome. Therefore, it is better to solving internal conflict through internal conflict resolving mechanisms.

The study employed a qualitative approach. Therefore, an exploratory designed is used. Semi-structure interview and document reviewed are used to collect data for primary and secondary source respectively. Cross-case, key event, and chronological order analysis strategy are used to analyze the collected data.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the study

External intervention can be defined as convention-breaking military, economic or political activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country that are targeted at the authority structure of the government (based, in support of the government or the opposition, or neutral), with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the parties in the conflict, specifically in the case of intra- state conflict (Regan, 2002) & (Rosenau, 1971). Intervention can be forcible or non-forcible, direct or indirect, overt or covert operation (Vinncet, 1974).

Globally, the practice of intervention revived following to World War II, the Cold war and the decolonization, with the USA and the USSR projecting their power into the domestic disputes of many states around the world. Their interventions aimed to support either the incumbent government or the opposition. Many external parties involved in the internal wars of Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia and Sudan prompted in those countries. The same things had been happened in the civil wars of Syria, Libya, and Yemen (Ilgaz, 2019).

Countries of Horn of Africa have been experienced with a number of armed Conflict ethno linguistic disputes, religious radicalism where it catches the attention of most developed nation including US for the strategic interest over the region (Mengistu, 2015). External factors have played an important role in destabilize the Horn of Africa. In countries of Horn of Africa including Ethiopia in which the motto and practice of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has been practiced (Redie Bereketaeb, 2012).

The Ethiopian government, engaged in a prolonged struggle against the Eritrean insurgency, faced punitive economic sanctions from the United States due to its involvement in humanitarian abuses (Ilgaz, 2019). Following to the northern part of Ethiopian conflict, that had been held between the federal government of Ethiopia and Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) since November 4, 2020 until November 2022, different regional and internationals actors intervened

through military, diplomacy, and economic action. For example, Eritrea involved in military, Egypt and Sudan have directly or indirectly been involved in the recurrent conflicts in Ethiopia (Berihu Asgele Siyum, 2021).

According to Eminue (2004), internal conflicts or (intra-states conflict) is one in which the governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that state seeking to overthrow those authorities with force of arms. The driver of conflicts are internal as much as they are external they entail international, regional, and local actors and networks which are at the same time social, economic, political and military (Zeleza,2008).

Investigating of effects of intervention on civil war has a great importance to the world over due the increasing of intra state conflict and involvement of foreign actors on the civil war. It is essential to study intervention and its effect, because, it helps to understand its' advantage and disadvantage both to the target nation and the interveners (Sousa, 2014). In recent decades, civil wars have become the most recurrent forms of conflict, and most of them are characterized by the active involvement of foreign actors - state, coalition or non-state actor (Einsiede, 2017).

2.2. Statement of the problem

External intervention can be influential in changing the direction of the intra-state conflicts. The significant effect of external intervention on the course of civil wars is explained by the majority of interventions having taken the form of providing assistance to one-side in the conflict (Lockyer, 2008). Effect of external intervention in intra-state war is measured by the duration of conflict and the intensity of the conflict Hogbladh et al. 2021).

Following to the northern part of Ethiopia an intra- state conflict has been began since November 4, 2020 between the federal government of Ethiopia and TPLF, various external actors involved in the conflict through a series of mechanisms- diplomatic, military and economic intervention. The war has transformed into a regional and international issue, posing a threat to the unity of the country and potentially leading to its disintegration (Berihun Asgele Seyum, 2021).

Existing knowledge regarding the effects of external intervention on conflict intensity and duration can be summarized as follows: External interventions in conflicts are often seen as

mechanisms to promote peace. However, research suggests that they rarely lead to a de-escalation of conflict intensity (Sousa, 2014). Studies focusing on the objectives of interventions indicate that one-sided interventions can increase the chances of success for the supported side (Balcha, Enterline & Joyce, 2008).

Regarding the types of intervention, research suggested that military and economic interventions tend to prolong conflicts (Elbadawi, Sambanis, & Regan, 2002). Based on the balance of capability model, confirmed that partisan, military, and economic interventions contribute to an increase in conflict intensity. Conversely, neutral or diplomatic interventions do not have such an effect (Sousa, 2014). In general, regardless of the target**,** external interventions often result in strengthening the capacity of the opposition while undermining the incumbent side, notably including any military assistance provided to the incumbent (Ilgaz, 2019).

Despite the multidimensional importance of looking into the effect of external intervention on a country (as far as the researcher's knowledge is concerned) no studies has been conducted to explore the effects of external interventions on the case of northern part of Ethiopian conflict. So, in order to fill this contextual gap, this study had been researched. In addition, almost all most previous studies have done by quantitative approach methods which utilized datasets that span back to the early 19th century, potentially neglecting recent data pertaining to the characteristics of internal conflicts and the nature of interventions, so to fill this methodological gap, this study had done by qualitative approach method.

Also, the earlier studies focused on only the mediation types of diplomatic intervention, but this study tried to fill the gap by addressing other types of diplomacy, such as humanitarians as well as media diplomacy. Lack of consistency in the conclusions drawn from previous research on the effect of military intervention on duration of conflict is also another gap. For example, Military intervention on side of rebel shorten the duration of the conflict, where as the side of state ineffective (Collier, Hoeffler ,& Soderbom ,2004),and (Cunningham, Gleditshi, & Salehyan, 2009). On the contrary,(Andorson’s ,2019) study, which suggested that external military assistance on the side of government reduce the duration of internal conflict, while the opposite holds true for rebels. This study filled this gap by solidifying the finding of Anderson.

The rational to this study is, now a day following to the northern Ethiopia conflict; Ethiopia is highly exposed to regional and international actors' intervention. Due to, Ethiopia's geopolitical importance along the HOA, near and distance individual states and international actors (organization) made the country a proxy and direct war ground for securing their national interest.

According to the (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project [ACLED] report in 2021), stated that currently Ethiopia has ranked as the top concern among the ten conflicts to worry about in 2021. Additionally, the International Crisis Group 2021 has ranked Ethiopia as the second conflict to watch in 2021. Consequently, the conflict situation in Ethiopia is not only deteriorating but also pushing the country towards potential fragmentation (Berihu Asgele Siyum, 2021). Therefore, in order to understand the effect of external interventions on the course of conflict between federal government of Ethiopia and TPLF on northern Ethiopia, this study has been conducted. To address the purpose of this study, the following research questions need to be answered:

1.3. Research questions

The intervening of various external actors has had various negative or positive effects on the course of northern part of Ethiopia conflict. The central research question of the study is: What effects do the intervention of various external actors on the course of the intra-state conflict of northern part of Ethiopia? To address the main research question, the study focused on the following specific research questions:

1. What are the roles of US, Eritrea, UNSC, China, UAE, Turkey, and Iran in the conflict of northern Ethiopia that held between the years on November 4, 2020 and on November, 2022?
2. What are the interests or motives of US, Eritrea, UNSC, China, UAE, Turkey, and Iran behind the intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopia that held between the years on November 4, 2020 and on November, 2022?
3. How do the intervention of US, Eritrea, UNSC, China, UAE, Turkey, and Iran in the conflict of northern Ethiopia that held between the years on November 4, 2020 and on November, 2022?

1.4. Objectives of the study

The general objective of this study is, to explore the effects of the intervention of different foreign actors on the course of the conflict that had been held between the Federal government and TPLF in Northern part of Ethiopia. Other specific objectives of the study are:

- Explaining the role of US, Eritrea, UNSC, China, UAE, Turkey, and Iran in the conflict of northern Ethiopia conflict that held between the years on November 4, 2020 and on November, 2022.
- Describing the reason/motive behind the intervention of US, Eritrea, UNSC, China, UAE, Turkey, and Iran in the northern Ethiopia conflict that held between the years on November 4, 2020 and on November, 2022.
- Examining how the intervention of US, Eritrea, UNSC, China, UAE, Turkey, and Iran affect the "course" of the conflict that held between the years on November 4, 2020 and on November, 2022.

1.5. Significance of the study

The finding of the study hold significant value for researchers and scholars as it contributed to the existing literature on intervention and internal conflicts. Specifically, the study serves as a valuable reference and source of data for future researchers exploring related topics.

The result and recommendation of the study would be beneficial to Ethiopia as well as other countries of Horn of Africa that have highly exposed to external intervention and intra-state conflicts have experienced. Furthermore, the findings are relevant for policymakers to the federal government of Ethiopian, as they provide insights into identifying and assessing gaps and strengths in addressing issues related to foreign relationships.

1.6. Scope of the study

In terms of area, the study focused on the regions of northern part of Ethiopia which includes Tigray, Amhara, and Afar. Northern part of Ethiopia located north of region of Oromiya, South of Eritrea, East of Sudan, and West of Djibouti and Eritrea. In terms of time, the study covers on the years between on November 4, 2020 and November 2, 2022.

Multiple regional and international actors have participated in the Ethiopian conflict, however, for the purpose of this study the roles and motives of Eritrea, US, UNSC, and AU, China, the

UAE, Turkey and Iran as well as how their role affected the course of the war had been examined. Indirectly the role and motives of others actors like, Russia and others may have been assessed on the behalf of UNSC. These actors are selected because of their active and dominant roles in the northern Ethiopia conflict.

1.7. Limitation of the study

The primary data of the study was collected only from the government institution with few interview respondents. It did not include the opinion of individuals from TPLF sides, due to, the security issues, and the availability of the representative of TPLF was not easy to the researcher. So this might be limitation of the study. However, to prevent or minimize this gap the researcher tried to gather the data from independent, international, and impartial secondary sources as well as secondary sources that closed to them (TPLF).

1.8. Operational definition of terms

The study displays the definition of the key terms of the topic (The effect of external intervention on the course of northern Ethiopia's conflict).

- Effect- The intensity, duration, and outcome of the conflict caused by the intervention.
- External intervention- the involvement of regional and international actors on Ethiopian internal conflict in peaceful and forceful, direct and indirect, and covertly or overtly.
- Northern Ethiopia- part of Ethiopia which consists of region of Tigray, Amhara and Afar.
- Internal Conflict or intra-conflict- an armed struggle between the federal government of Ethiopia and Tigray people liberation front.
- Diplomatic intervention- the engagement of external actors, such as other states or international organizations, in mediating or influencing the resolution of conflicts through diplomatic means, negotiations, or diplomatic initiatives, including humanitarian diplomacy, media diplomacy and other political activities.
- Conflict duration: the expected survival time to get military or political victory or solution to the conflict between the parties.
- Conflict intensity: the degree or level of escalation, emotion, tension, and pressure involved in a conflict situation. Course: the path the conflict., way, a mode of action

1.9. Organization of the study

This study was divided into five chapters whereby Chapter one of the study: Introduction which consist of background of the study, Statement of the problem, the Research questions, Objectives of the study, Significant of the study, Scope of the study, Operational definition of the terms, Limitation of the study, and Organization of the study

Chapter two of the research study discus the Method and Materials of the study, Chapter three the Review of related literature, Chapter four discus the Result of the study, the final Chapter include the Conclusion and the Recommendation of the study. It also contains the Reference material /Bibliography, and Appendix of the study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Empirical research on external intervention

2.1.1. Intervention

When exploring the effects of external intervention in northern Ethiopia conflict that has been held between the federal government of Ethiopia and TPLF from November 4, 2020-November 2, 2022, has not been done. Many scholars agree that there are conditions under which third parties choose to intervene in an internal conflict. According to Pearson et al (see in Regan, 1998) identified geography, geopolitical motives and the level of conflict are the most important factors directly associated with military interventions of third parties in intrastate conflict. In similar issues, Hans Morgenthau notes that interventions take place when national interests are at stake (Regan, 1998). In other words, internal conflicts negatively affect international security in general and neighboring states in particular and this triggers external interventions. For instance one of the reasons UNSC needs to intervene in Ethiopian conflict was as it had threat on the security of the HOA as well as international security.

Similarly, individual states intervene in conflicts in other regions or in an intrastate conflict often with concerns of national interest even if they are geographically far away from them (Geib, 2009). For example United State of America and China intervened in the northern Ethiopian conflict.

According to Regan (2002), and Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), who observed most generally and strongly that intervention leads longer duration civil wars without considering any type (military or diplomatic, or economic) of intervention. According to Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski (2005), who argue that even without any aid actually being given, expectation of aid from state rivals can motivate them to continuing fighting, as these expectations significantly decrease the hazard rate. Also, they find that rival intervention can substantially prolong duration of Civil war.

2.1.2. Military intervention

Military interventions on side of rebel shorten the duration of the conflict, where as the side of state ineffective (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom, 2004). Also others scholars such as (Cunningham, Gleditshi, & Salehyan, 2009) supported the above conclusion. However, on the contrary, external military assistance on the side of governments decrease duration of conflict, on the other hand, increase on the side of rebels but in modern intra state conflict may decrease duration of conflict (Andorson ,2019), also she fined that competitive intervention, which she defines as "two sided" simultaneously military assistance from different third party states both the government and the rebel combatants", prolong civil war because it has a distorted effected on bargaining process of domestic combatants. Recent research on periods of instability, not necessary only civil war, confirms some of the results that military interventions increase the likelihood of civil war escalation (Regan& Meachum, 2014).

2.1.3. Diplomatic intervention

According to Olson & Person (2002), examined the association between the mediation success and the identity of the third party while controlling for relevant features of conflict. Central to their argument is the idea that an insider mediator who comes from a country of origin located within conflict region might fare better in leading to the settlement of a disputed compared to outside parties.

According to, Abdelrahman& Lee (2016), historical ties to the mediator actually decrease the likely offer acceptance, while the reputation of the mediator increases it. A number of scholars speculated about the role of external party neutrality for mediation success. According to Svenssone (2007), focusing on the incumbent's concerns about commitment's problems, he suggest that government-biased mediation help to overcome incumbent's some of the concerns about the implementation phase and thus contribute to diffusing conflicts. He codified mediation as biased if a procure of mediation provide any support to disputants before the actual talks, but instead focuses on the course of the war before the negotiation takes place. Secondly, the coefficient for state-biased mediations in Svensson's study is found significant and positive; and it is not significant for rebel-biased interventions. That is, rebel-biased intervention, according to his argument, seems to be determinant to any mediation outcome, decrease the likelihood of success in the diplomatic attempt. According to Greig and Regan (2008), underscore the

importance of resources allocated by the third parties for mediation, and claim that major powers with their superior resources available for diplomatic process play a key role in bringing success to their mediation attempts.

Other literature focused on the timing of diplomatic efforts in civil conflict. Most famously, the role of intervention timing is known as 'ripening' and referred to the concept of mutually hurting stalemate (MHS)'. According to Zartman (1985), disputants are most likely to accept mediation and cooperate for conflict resolution only after certain conditions are met. Zartman argues that "when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek a way out" (Zartman, 2000). Put differently, hurting stalemate occurs when opponents' sides have reached an impasse in their conflict such that neither is likely to prevail or achieve their goals through force (Greig & Diehl, 2006). Thus, best time for mediation in a civil conflict comes when domestic parties find themselves in such a stalemate. Zartman's MHS argument and high-casualty incidences serve as the agent for mutually hurting stalemates in conflict supported by (Mooradian &Druckman, 1999)

In related research, proposes that political shocks cause a de-escalation process in intractable civil conflicts and a following mediation is helpful to settle it (Rasler, 2000). According to the argument, these conflicts are ripened in the wake of political shocks and ensuing diplomatic intervention contribute to terminating such disputes. In a more extensive testing of Zartman's theory (Schrodt, Yilmaz, & Gerner ,2003) under took to operationalize Zartman's ripening and MHS concepts. Using time- series event data about the conflicts from different countries case, they sought to figure out which conflict characteristic can be associated with ripening and MHS concepts. After their nuanced empirical scrutiny, while MHS is associated with conflict duration.

According to Regan & Stam (2000), find the time of the intervention plays a critical role; when early and latter intervention in conflict is linked to reduce expected duration. On the contrary, mediation in what is exposit the middle of the conflict actually increases the length of a civil war but mediation intervention is most effective in the middle of the conflict. Early and late increase the duration of the civil war (Regan & Aydin, 2006). According to, Greig and Regan, 2008, third parties offer negotiation are more likely when it has interest in civil war state. State attempted to mediate early in the conflict, and hesitate to intervention at the middle of the civil

war (Aydin, 2010). Inconsistency among the findings of the study, and lack of focus on different types of intervention in the same conflict. They all are conducted only based on secondary data sources are some of the limitations of the previous study.

2.2. Theoretical framework

2.2.1. Balance of capability

The balances of capabilities of the parties to the conflict play a decisive role in the outcome of the fight (Eldabawi & Sambanis, 2000). Parties choose for a military or political solution depending on the expected net benefit of the outcome of the conflict versus a settlement through negotiations (Wittman 1979). External interventions affect the absolute or relative capabilities of parties by changing their expected payoffs of conflict determined by a cost- benefit analysis of fighting, risk preferences and estimation on the likelihood of victory or no-defeat (Regan, 1996, 2002). Biased interventions aim to achieve victory for one-side regardless of conflict escalation or duration whereas neutral interventions' objective is to de-escalate or solve the actual conflict (Hogbladh et al, 2011).

2.2.2. Concept of Regional Dimension of Internal conflict

According to Brown (1996), gives four types of intervention of neighboring states in others' internal conflicts. First, humanitarian intervention: when neighboring states are motivated only by humanitarian situations in internal conflicts. Second, defensive intervention: the motive of this type of intervention is therefore not to end the conflict holistically but to stop it from spreading to own boarders by intervening in an internal conflict of others in the pretext of defending national security. Third, protective intervention: this is an intervention of states in an internal conflict with objectives of backing up of different identity group to secure a certain agenda. This action is often justified by national security concern. The fourth type of intervention is opportunistic intervention. This type intervention takes place when neighboring states take the advantage of internal weaknesses and turmoil. Such internal weaknesses have the potential to create windows of opportunities for other states which have strategist interest make them vulnerable for invasion and manipulation. Neighboring states usually support friendly rebel groups as well as engage in proxy wars with other rival states while trying to mask their actions with innocence.

In this perspective, internal conflicts have regional dimensions posing serious threats to neighboring states further provoking them to involve in the local conflict in the context of insecurity. This had been what practiced in northern part of Ethiopia and attract international actors.

2.2.3. Concepts of "New Wars"

Kaldor argues that the process of globalization contributes to the new wars; therefore, today's wars are characterized by global modernity, because they use new materials and technologies. New technologies and modern military equipment such as drones, robots and computers, as well as modern mean s of communication, allow actors to reduce their casualties. However, new wars are characterized by modern war characters, intervention using these modern technologies turns out to be clumsy in bringing that anticipated effects on the ground. For example, the use of drones as one of the most sophisticated war equipment has become counterproductive in some conflicts. Kaldor explained that in some cases, the technology may have a positive impact on warfare, but in most cases (Kaldor, 2012, p. 4).

As parts of the new nature of war, conflicts fascinate actors in multiple contexts; Journalist, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mercenaries and military advisers are also new features of the war. And today's intervention in the conflict may not represent the only actors involved in hostilities in one way or another. The new wars are also characterized by regional states and organization; these can be aid organizations and peacekeeping forces (Kaldor, 2012, p. 5).

However, to examine and determined which contradiction fit the "new war" class; we must look at the sign of conflict. Based on the complexity of the conflict in question, Ethiopia conflict fit with kaldor's explanation of new wars. Ethiopian conflict attracted many and big power countries.

2.2.4. Theories of Intervention and Duration of civil war

According to Mouritsen (2020), the relationship between intervention and duration has been researched from various perspectives. Some of them are classified into four broad categories. These are: The perspective of Intervention leads increased duration. According to Regan (2002), retains the conclusion most interventions prolong the duration of civil conflicts, and that there is no mix of intervention strategies that leads to shorter civil conflict duration.

The perspective of Side-taking intervention determines Conflict Duration. The effect of intervention depends on with whom the external actor(s) side: the rebels or the government. According to (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom, 2004), find that military intervention on the side of rebel group shortens conflict duration, but economic intervention has an insignificant effect on conflict duration.

The Perspective of Competitive Intervention Increases conflict Duration. According to Balcha-Lindsay & Enterline (2000), find that when one external actor provides the rebel or the government group with resources, other third parties are motivated to counterbalance these contributions by providing opposite group by resources (p.632). The authors find that when balanced intervention is present, the hazard for a civil war decreases, but its duration increases (p.633).

The Perspective of Motivation behind Intervention Determines Its Effect on Duration. In their research, Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski (2005), focus on the relationship between rival intervention and civil war duration, specifically the effect it might have on rebel's inclination to either keep fighting or negotiate. Naturally, rivals are motivated to intervene in order to manipulate the civil war outcome to their advantage, making theme likely to assist the rebels and seek to shift the balance of power in their favor (P. 352). Therefore, it is right to examine the northern part of Ethiopia's conflict from these perspectives in order to gain better insights.

3. METHODS AND MATERIALS

3.1. The Research approach

The study utilized qualitative research approach to explore the effect of external intervention on the course of internal conflict. So, this research employed an exploratory research design. Since, the study problem has no hypothetical assumption outcome or no pre-determined outcome, qualitative approach is better. Since the study problem is un researched in the case of northern Ethiopia conflict, much data are needed, so qualitative approach is better than qualitative approach. The How affect…? Question of the study is enabled to answer more by qualitative research approach than qualitative approach, because it needs detailed investigation.

3.2. The Research design

The study used exploratory research design, since no research has been studied on the research problem in the case of northern Ethiopia conflict. It is a timing or ongoing as well as small scale study. The purpose of the study is mainly to find new insight on the problem rather than verifying the existing theories.

3.3. Sources of data

This study utilized a combination of primary and secondary data sources, thereby enhancing the reliability and validity of the findings.

3.3.1. Primary data sources

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to obtain primary data from esteemed members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) and Ethiopian Diaspora Services (EDS). These interviews took place in person, on an individual basis. The selection process for these experts utilized purposive sampling techniques because they are close with the intended data to the research questions.

3.3.2. Secondary data sources

The study's secondary data was mainly collected from a selected document reviewed , including Journals of African Studies Center Leiden, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, Eritrea focus on the Tigray war & regional implications (volume 1&2, Asylum Research Center (ARC) reports and records, Security Council press statements and reports. Additionally, the Armed Conflict Location &Event Project (ACLEP) reports were consulted. The opinion of Wubegzeer Ferede (Ph.D.), a senior researcher at Institutes of Foreign Affairs (IFA) on external intervention in the Ethiopian conflict was also considered. This opinion was obtained from ETV, Dagu program's YouTube channel on October 19th, 2022. The sampling techniques employed in this study are elaborated upon in section 3.4.

3.4. Sampling and Sampling Techniques

The study used non-probability sampling method. Because, the purpose of the study is to explore in a small participants for providing an explanation. The experts serving as respondents for primary data sources were selected through the purposive method this is due to find better data, from better concerned participants. The interviews were held with two experts one from Institute of Foreign Minister (IFA) and one from Ethiopia Diaspora service (EDS). The secondary data sources utilized in this study consist of written and unwritten documents pertaining to the topics from November 2020 to November 2022. Purposive sampling techniques were employed in selecting printed and electronic (audio-visual) texts, enabling the researcher to select specific texts that meet the criteria for answering study questions.

3.5. Data gathering tools

Existing data and interviews are used to gather the data. Official documents, Physical data and archived research data were reviewed for insights as well as ideas and suggestions offered by politicians, activists, journalists, and various individuals through online research. A semi-structured interview technique was utilized to acquire data from experts from the Institutes of foreign affairs and Ethiopian Diasporas Services.

3.6. Methods of Data Collection

The study utilized a combination of primary and secondary data sources. Predominantly, the data are collected from secondary sources. The primary data was collected through personal

interactions with experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly from IFA and EDS, who were selected using purposive sampling method. On the other hand, secondary data was obtained by reviewing previous research articles, mass media reports, electronic books and suggestions from Google experts. This enabled the researcher to obtain impartial insights from various regional and international experts across different secondary sources. To analyze the effect of interventions on conflict duration, intensity and outcome, data collection took place in three distinct phases of the conflict and each phase was analyzed independently.

3.7. Methods of data analysis

Thematic analysis was utilized to analyze primary data, while content analysis was employed for secondary data. The collected data underwent cross-case, key events, and chronological analysis strategy for thorough examination. Simultaneous analysis of the gathered information was conducted throughout the collection process.

For understanding the duration, intensity as well as outcomes of the two years conflict, the collected data have been discussed in three phases of the conflict based on the erupting of or the declaration of fresh war. The first phase, it covers from (November, 4 2020-June, 28 2021). Since, the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has ordered the ENDF, to carry out a “law enforcement operation” in Tigray up to the recapture of Mekelle on 28, June 2021 by Tigray forces. This phase also divided into early and later stage of the phase, which covers from (November, 4 2020 until the capture of Mekele by ENDF and EDF, and from December, 2020 until the recapture of Meklele by Tigray forces respectively. The second phase, covers from the expansion time of the conflict into the region of Amhara and Afar (July, 2021-August 23, 2022). The third phase, covers from (August 24, 2022 until the peace talk)

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The data has been analyzed on the basis of the selected external actors, such as Eritrea's, US's, UNSC's, China, the UAE, Iran and AU's roles and motives, as well as their influence on the course of the conflict. The findings of the study would serve to either contribute value or confirm existing literature on intervention and internal conflict. They also serve as reference material and a source of data for future researchers studying related issues.

4.1. The role of external actors

4.1.1. The role of Eritrea in the conflict of northern Ethiopian

Eritrea involved in a military intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopian sided with Ethiopia and attacked the TPLF. Before the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018 with the arrival of Prime Minister Abiy, they had a long history of hostility with Ethiopia regarding the region of Tigray, specifically in the area of Badme in northern Ethiopia. This hostility even led to interstate wars between 1998 and 2000.

During the first phase of the conflict, Eritrea participated in the conflict along the entire border it shares with the Tigray regional state, as well as inside Tigray itself. Ethiopian troops, organized and reinforced in Eritrea, launched a series of offensives into Tigray from Eritrea along four frontlines. Eritrea provided intelligence and logistical support, and its heavy weapons took an active role in the combat. At the Zalambesa front, two mechanized divisions and four infantry divisions were deployed. This may have resulted in intense fighting faced by the Tigray forces as they advanced towards Edga Hamus, south of Adigrat. They were reinforced with an additional five divisions of the infantry, including the 2nd brigade of the 525th commando division (Mesfin Hagose, 2020).

At the Adwa front, three infantry divisions and two mechanized divisions were sent. On this front, only one division of the Ethiopian army participated (Mesfin Hagose, 2020). Furthermore, the TPLF claims that Eritrean technical and combat units also actively participated in the Alamata front. In total, there were 12 divisions of infantry army, four divisions of the mechanized army, and two brigades of commandos actively involved during the early period of the first phase of the war.

Eritrean generals were not operated under Ethiopian command structure and had been lead the fight on the northern front. It is believed that the Ethiopian army would not have been able to capture Mekele without the support of Eritrea (Omer, 2022). On the morning of November 28, a group of TPLF militia and some local residents launched an attack on Eritrean soldiers. In the afternoon, the Eritrean forces entered the city of Axum and carried out widespread killings of young men and boys in the streets and during house searches. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) was reportedly present in Axum but allegedly did not take action to protect civilians (UN Working Group, 2021). After four weeks of intense war, both the Ethiopian National Defense Force and the Eritrean Defense Force entered Mekele on November 28, 2020.

On November 30, 2020, Eritrean soldiers killed approximately 80 people, including men, women, and children, in a village called Dengel. Eritrean forces had also been reported to attack hundreds of civilians in different parts of the Tigray region, resulting in occasional clashes with the Ethiopian national defense force (ACLED, 2021). Allegations of Eritrean crimes against civilians have played a critical role in strengthening the resistance in Tigray (ICG, 2021). The Eritrean government has denied the involvement of its troops in the Ethiopian conflict (Brookings Institute, 2020). Eritrea has deployed a significant portion of its army in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (African Argument, 2020). It was a war between TPLF and Eritrea, particularly during the first phase of the conflict.

On March 23, 2021, Abiy admitted the involvement of Eritrea in the Ethiopian conflict. Three days later, he issued a statement announcing that the Eritrean government had agreed to withdraw its troops. However, Ethiopia is currently unable to demand the withdrawal of the Eritrean military without the support of Eritrea, as it relies on their assistance to contain and ultimately defeat the TPLF. Eritrea has shown no willingness to withdraw. Tigrayan officials and civilians have accused Eritrean troops of mass killings, systematic looting, and vandalism – claims that have been substantiated by aid workers (ICG, 2021).

However, before Abiy's announcement on March 23, 2021, six brigades of the Eritrean forces had returned from Tigray to Eritrea. These brigades had been heavily involved in the fighting and had suffered significant casualties. By the end of March 2021, the remaining popular militia had returned to central Eritrea, with only a few rotating in western Eritrea and the border area.

Also, others two brigades from the active fighting area in the lowland region of Tigray arrived in Badme and Biyara in a large convoy (African Argument, 2021).

In April 2021, the levels of violence in Tigray had generally decreased. However, Eritrean forces opened fire and killed at least nine civilians, injuring 12 in Adwa town. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) intervened and stopped the Eritrean forces on April 12, 2021 (Reuters, April 14, 2021). Eritrean forces remained active at the end of April 2021 (ACLED, 2021). With the federal troops facing challenges, thousands of Eritrean forces retreated northward to take up positions along Eritrea's contested border with Ethiopia when the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) advanced to control Mekele (ICG, 2021). The extent of damage inflicted on the Ethiopian and Eritrean armies is difficult to estimate, but at least 7,000 soldiers were taken captive (ACLED, 2021), though the government denies this number. The Eritrean forces, who are allied with the ENDF, had also been occupying parts of Tigray but retreated and left the towns of Shire, Adwa, and Axum (Global Center for Responsibility to Protect, 2021).

During the second phase of the conflict (July, 2021-August23, 2022), in August 2021, a month after the second phase of the war began, it was reported by the US Congressional Research Service that a large number of Eritrean troops had re-entered Ethiopia (Blanchard, 2021). Eritrea participated in ground attacks in northern Tigray when the ENDF launched air strike operations in October 2021 (Reuters, 2021). According to Asylum Research Center (2021), reported in August 2021, the area under the control of the Eritrean Defense Forces has significantly decreased and is now restricted to areas along the Ethio-Eritrea border. However, there is a high presence of EDF along the Ethio-Sudan border and the Tekeze River (p.68).
During the expansion of the TPLF into Afar and Amhara, the involvement of Eritrean forces backed by the ENDF was restricted. Their advances were limited to cutting the logistics supply line of the TPLF via Mille, causing the TPLF troops to hastily retreat from hundreds of kilometers away within a few days (Hagose Gebreamlak, 2022). It can be said that in the second phase of the war, Eritrea followed a containment policy rather than an offensive one, particularly refraining from participating in the conflict taking place in Amhara (Hagose Gebreamlak, 2022). The interviewee from IFA and EDS shared the idea of Hagose that state the contained policy of Eritrea followed during the second as well as the third phase of the conflict.

The third phase o f the conflict (August 24, 2022- Nov 2, 2022), began on August 24, 2022, between the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) around the town of Kobo (Reuters, 2022). On the morning of September 1, the TPLF claimed that Eritrean artillery began a barrage of shells. Eritrea's involvement remained evident. On September 7, 2022, authorities in the Tigray region accused Eritrean forces of shelling the outskirts of Adigrat throughout the day (Reuter, 2022). Tigray-based media reported that five civilians were killed and 14 more were injured after heavy shelling by Eritrean forces in Adigrat and its surroundings (Casiavo, 2022).

In a significant development during a joint offensive by Ethiopia and Eritrea in the north, the Ethiopian forces captured the strategic city of Shire on October 17, 2022, as reported by the Security Council (Security Council Report, 2022). This occurred while the government of Ethiopia and the TPLF agreed to engage in peace talks mediated by the African Union (AU). The Eritrean army's engagement on the ground was limited to incursions on TPLF military establishments, and large-scale fighting has not yet occurred. However, there have been reports of cross-border artillery firing and movements of soldiers in the western areas of Tigray that border Eritrea (Hagose Gebreamlak, 2022). In general, Eritrea played an active role in the planning, initiation, and execution of the Ethiopian conflict (Mesfin Hagose ,2020).

4.1.2. The role of US Intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopian

During the first phase of the conflict (on November 4, 2020-June28, 2021): During the early part of the first phase from on November 4, 2020, to November 28, 2020, the involvement of the United States was limited. On November 17, 2020, the U.S. condemned the TPLF after it attacked the capital of Eritrea, Asmara's airport, as well as the airports in Bahirdar and Gonder in the Amhara region. On November 19, 2020, during a press briefing at the US Department of State, US officials expressed their grave concern about the TPLF's initial attack on November 3rd on ENDF bases in the Tigray region, both publicly and privately (US Department of State, 2020).

However, during the latter part of the first phase of the conflict, which covered from December 2020 to June 2021, the United States, as soon as Biden took state power on January 20, 2021, as president of US, the situation was changed. The US became actively involved both unilaterally

and multilaterally. The role of the US focused on five themes. Firstly, the government of US characterized the conflict as ethnic cleansing. On March 10, 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused the Ethiopian government of "ethnic cleansing" in Western Tigray and emphasized the need to put a stop to it (US Department of State, 2021). However, Ethiopia denied this allegation.

The second theme that the US focused, the withdrawal of Eritrean troops and the Amhara Special Force from Tigray. The Biden Administration has prioritized the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and has aimed to coordinate with like-minded governments on addressing the Tigray crisis (Blanchard, 2021). US Secretary Blinken has called for the withdrawal of the Amhara Special Force from Tigray as well (Abbink, 2021). On February 25, 2021, the State Department once again requested that the Eritrean forces to be withdrawn. On May 20, 2021, the US Senate passed S. Res 97, which condemned all violence against civilians in Tigray and called for the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring Ethiopian Tigray region. Additionally, H. Res. 445 similarly called for the removal of Eritrean forces (Blanchard, 2021).

The third theme that the US focused on humanitarian situation. While it may be seen as a pretext, the overt role of the US was indeed focused on addressing humanitarian issues. On March 18, 2021, Senator Chris traveled to Ethiopia at President Biden's request to convey the administration's grave concerns about the humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses in the Tigray region, as well as the risk of broader instability in the Horn (Congressional Research Service, 2021) p. 23. The United States does everything, both covert and overt actions, to influence its political, economic, and military interest in Ethiopia and the HOA by intervening on the northern part of the Ethiopian conflict (interview, October 23, 2023).

The fourth theme that the US focused on the use of diplomatic as well as economic sanctions on parties involved in the conflict. In May 2021, the Biden Administration announced visa restrictions for all officials of the belligerent parties who were responsible for undermining the resolution of the Tigray Crisis (Blanchard, 2021). Furthermore, in August 2021, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the EDF Chief of Staff, General Flipose Woldeyohanse, pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle of P.L. 114-328) (Blanchard, 2021).

The final theme was that the US focused on the ceasefire and negotiation. On March 21, 2021, Senator Chris Coons traveled to Ethiopia at the request of President Biden to convey concerns about the humanitarian crisis, human rights abuses, and the need for a ceasefire. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rejected the ceasefire and negotiation, but acknowledged the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray and expressed willingness to engage in dialogue with the international community to address the crisis (Congressional Research Service, 2021) p.23. However, nothing more eventuated, and Coons soon expressed disappointment at the lack of improvement. A sense of disheartenment and deflation appeared to emanate from the US government.

On the same issue, interview results with IFA and EDS experts showed that, the US attempted to pressure the Ethiopian government to negotiate with the TPLF on an equal basis, but the Ethiopian government rejected it (interview, in October 2023). According to Macleod (2021), the current chief of USAID, Samantha Power, has expressed a stance by stating that "all options are on the table" unless Ethiopia engages in negotiation with the TPLF. During this phase, as various sources show, in January, February, March, April, May, and June 2021, mounting diplomatic pressure, at least 25 times either in a visit, by telephone, or by issuing a press statement or in any other type of diplomacy, was done only by the U.S. concerning the crisis.

According to Worku Abera (2021), the US was planned for regime change in Ethiopia. He used Tibor Nagy, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and former US Ambassador to Ethiopia under the Trump administration statement's as a reference that stated " the TPLF was acting more to remove the prime minister from office and reclaim the prominent position at the top of Ethiopian politics that they had held for the previous 27 years.'' In my view, the above, ideas of Tibor Nagy, may indicate that the US backed the TPLF to take power either at the regional or national level.

During the second phase of the conflict (July 2021-July 2022): USAID official Samantha Power traveled to Addis Ababa in July 2021, where she emphasized the US. concern over lack of humanitarian access to Tigray as well as the Ethiopian government's use of dehumanizing rhetoric to describe members of the Tigray ethnic group and the TPLF in the lead-up to the outbreak of conflict. US officials were disappointed by Abiy failure to respond to the request of the United States (Foreign Policy, 2022). On August 23, 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed concern that a significant number of Eritrean defense forces had re-entered

Ethiopia after having withdrawn in June (Security Council Report, 2021). According to, expert Gerald and Bruton stated that, “the U.S. one-sided approach provided political cover to the TPLF rebels’’ (Foreign Policy, 2021). The US government has denied the claim of supporting the TDF to march in Addis Ababa (Ethiopian Observer, 2021). TPLF, along with eight other anti-government factions, tried to collide, aiming to "totally dismantle the existing federal government of Ethiopia either by force or negotiation and establish a transitional government" (Reuters, November 5, 2021). According to an interview made by Getachew K. Reda on Tigrinya Television, stated:

> It is hard to know what the American stance is. Sometimes the Americans threaten to put sanctions and put pressure on both of us to bring to negotiation. At other times, they would say if the TPLF entered Addis Ababa, there would be bloodbath. They would also tell us, if we enter Addis Ababa, it had better for us to foster a broad coalition and bring other parties together (Ethiopian Observer, 2021).

I argue on some points of Getachew Reda; in my view, it is clear the stance of America. It is worth noting that the statement of US sanctions and negotiation with the TPLF, but it was bad for Abiy Ahmed. Initially, the US had the need to hold the negotiation based on the preconditions that were set by the TPLF; it would also be done based on equal status with Abiy Ahmed. So, where is the bad news? They supported the TPLF under the mask of the Tigray people. Additionally, his interviews tell us that, the Reuter disseminated on November 5, 2021, that the coalition of anti-government groups, including the TPLF, aimed to depose the federal government of Ethiopia. It was the architect of America. Though, it was denied by America.

In the same issue, interview results with IFA experts showed that the US exerted pressure and facilitated the organization of the nine anti-government parties, including the TPLF Coalition, in order to establish a confederate transitional government (though rejected by US) (interview, October 2023). This occurred during the second phase of the conflict in the Amhara and Afar regions, when the TPLF announced its coalition with the Oromo Liberation Army. On November 19, 2021, the U.S. Maj. Gen. William Zana, commander of the combined Task Force of the HOA, has said in an interview that American forces would have taken military action in Ethiopia to respond to the Tigray crisis (Washington Post, 2021).

In early August 2022, US and its allies discussed with Ethiopia and reached an agreement as the government is ready to talks anytime, anywhere, and that talks should begin without preconditions **(**Addis standard news, 2022). On August 2, 2022, US-led western diplomats paid a visit to Mekele and met TPLF leaders. On the same day the envoys released a statement as they agreed that a swift restoration of social service, as recognized in earlier discussions with the Ethiopian government **(**Addis standard news, 2022.)

During the third phase of the conflict from (August24, 2022-November2, 2022): Interviews resulted from EDS and IFA stated that during this phase of the conflict, the means and ends of both the US and TPLF began to decline following the military victory tied to Abiy, especially since mid-September, 2022. They [US. and its allies] prefer to engagement with the federal government. The U.S. tried to continue previously aborted negotiation through AU mediation without preconditions.

Generally, according to Plaut (2021), U.S. expended its time and political capital to try to intervene to halt the conflict, with limited success. In the end, US inclined to the federal government of Ethiopia, because the military victory tied to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on the half of second phase and early third phase of the conflict and tried to held peace talk between the warring parties mainly in the favor of the federal government. In sum up, United States against Ethiopia on hybrid war.

4.1.3. The role of the United Nations Security Council in the conflict in northern Ethiopia

During the first phase of the conflict November 4, 2020-until June, 2021): During the first phase of the conflict, the Security Council convened six meetings to discuss the ongoing situation since it erupted on November 4, 2020. All of these meetings were held under the agenda item "any other business" in closed consultations. The primary focus of these meetings was on the humanitarian situation, with the Security Council deliberating upon the respective roles and responsibilities of both the council itself and the Ethiopian government in addressing this issue. Additionally, in five of the meetings, apart from the humanitarian concerns, discussions also took place regarding the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Ethiopian territory and the restoration of certain basic services in the Tigray region. This information is sourced from the Security Council meeting report spanning the 2020-2021 period.

Among the six meetings, the last meeting on June 14, 2021, differed from the others in that it included additional agenda items. Alongside the issues mentioned earlier, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) requested an open meeting to discuss and present a white paper that referenced Resolution 2417 of May 24, 2018. The white paper focused on the conflict-induced food security risks in Tigray and highlighted the link between food insecurity levels and the ongoing hostilities (Security Council meeting report, 2020-2021). However, this request for an open meeting was opposed by Russia, China, and the A3 countries. In all of the meetings, except for this last one, the Security Council members agreed to issue press statements. These statements typically acknowledge the efforts of the Ethiopian government, particularly in April 2021. However, apart from these press statements, there were no other concrete outcomes or products from the Security Council meetings during this period. During the second phase of the conflict (July 2021-2022): During the second phase of the conflict, the Security Council convened eight meetings to address the situation in Tigray. Out of these eight meetings, six were held under the "any other business" agenda, while two meetings were open sessions specifically focused on peace and security in Africa. However, it is worth noting that these open sessions faced opposition from Russia, China, and the A3 countries (Kenya, Niger, and Tunisia), who argued against discussing the issue in an open format within the Council. For the purpose of this study, only two of these meetings have been analyzed.

The first open session of the Council, held on July 2, 2021, was dedicated to discussing the situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia under the agenda of "Peace and Security in Africa." The second meeting took place on November 8, 2021, also under the same agenda. These meetings were prompted by significant events, namely the announcement of a humanitarian ceasefire on November 2, 2021, and reports of the TPLF's advancement towards the center of Ethiopia.

During this meeting, several council members publicly called for an end to the violence, a sustained and negotiated ceasefire, and the initiation of inclusive dialogue to address the situation. The United States, for example, expressed concerns over the actions of Ethiopian forces, highlighting instances of looting of humanitarian organization offices, destruction of communication equipment, and bridges as they retreated from Mekele. The US emphasized the need for all looted equipment to be returned, stating that the current situation resembled a siege rather than a humanitarian ceasefire (UNSC meeting record, 2021).

This indicates two significant points. Firstly, it suggests that the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) were defeated by the Tigrayan forces. Secondly, it highlights that the United States did not acknowledge the ceasefire declared by the Ethiopian government. The Tigray Defense Force dismissed the ceasefire as a "joke" and vowed to intensify their struggle, which was announced just three days prior to the Security Council meeting (ICG, 2021). During the council meeting, Di Carlo, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peace building Affairs, informed members that as of the meeting date, the TPLF had not agreed to a ceasefire (UNSC meeting record, 2021). However, this fact did not receive serious attention from the US and some others who called for an end to the fighting. They viewed the ceasefire announcement as a pretext and an opportunity for the Security Council to take action to end the conflict.

In contrast, other council members, including China, Russia, and the A3 countries, acknowledged the ceasefire declaration by the Ethiopian government. They emphasized the need for all opposing stakeholders to respect the ceasefire and for Ethiopia to be given the space to build upon and solidify this new development in order to address the situation internally (UNSC meeting record, 2021).

The second meeting, which was mentioned earlier, took place after the declaration of a state of emergency on November 2, 2021, and reports of the TPLF advancing towards the center of Ethiopia. During this meeting, former Nigerian President Obasanjo urged the Security Council to press both the federal government and the TPLF to engage in political dialogue without preconditions.

Certain council members, those from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Ireland, primarily focused on earlier events in the Tigray region. They called for addressing the accountability gap, an immediate ceasefire and negotiation, as well as the impact of the declared state of emergency. They expressed opposition to the state of emergency, as evidenced by Mrs. Thomas-Greenfield, the US representative, stating, "We will do everything in our power to keep our people safe" (UNSC meeting record, 2022).

In contrast, other council members, particularly Russia and China, placed emphasis on the recent deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Amhara and Afar regions due to the TPLF's advancement towards the center. They highlighted the need for the Security Council to allow for the African Union's (AU) efforts in peace talks and to provide space and time for these initiatives. Ultimately, the members of the Security Council expressed their full support for AU intervention to halt the conflict (UNSC meeting record, 2022).

During the third phase of the conflict from August 24 to November 2, 2022 the members of the Security Council convened two meetings. The first meeting took place after the resumption of the conflict on September 28, 2022, under the framework of the Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) on Ethiopia. The second meeting, held on October 22, 2022, was a private session that specifically addressed the recent escalation of violence. The main objective of this private session was to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and to discuss how the Security Council can lend support to the African Union's mediation efforts.

In all phases of the conflict, during the various meetings held, all members of the Security Council expressed concerns about the situation in Ethiopia and recognized the importance of ensuring humanitarian access to the affected population. However, there was no consensus among the council members on the most appropriate approach to responding to the crisis. Biased positions emerged within the council, with some members favoring the Ethiopian government

and others supporting the TPLF. These positions were often influenced by national interests, particularly with the competing positions of China, Russia, India, and the A3 countries on one side, and the United States and its Western allies on the other.

While the Security Council did not take collective action, it still had an influence on the conflict. Various UN entities, such as humanitarian organizations and human rights bodies, played a crucial role in the conflict by providing reports to the Secretary-General and the Security Council. These reports will be further discussed in upcoming sessions. According to Carver, tensions between Western powers and Russia and China were already leading to fewer working mechanisms within the Security Council, with more instances of "hard no's" and less compromise.

4.1.4. The role of the AU in the conflict in northern Ethiopia

During the first phase of the conflict (November 4, 2020- November 28, 2020): On November 9, 2020, AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki issued a statement calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and urging the involved parties to engage in dialogue to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. AU President Cyril Ramaphosa, on November 24, appointed three high-level envoys, former African heads of state, to serve as mediators and facilitate peace negotiations and conflict resolution. These envoys traveled to Addis Ababa to discuss matters with Prime Minister Abiy, but their mediation offer was rejected on November 27, 2020 (Blanchare, 2021).

The following day**,** the final phase of the war was declared. In December 2020, AU Commission Head Moussa Faki described Ethiopia's military operation in Tigray as legitimate, while expressing concern over the human suffering in the region (Blanchare, 2021). In June, the AU launched a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights abuses in Tigray. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced this initiative, stating that it was outside the scope of the government's invitation (Blanchare, 2021).

4.1.5. The role of the UAE, Turkey, and Iran in the conflict in northern Ethiopia

In the very early days of the conflict, the TPLF accused the UAE, which assisted the Ethiopian army with drones dispatched from an airbase in Eritrea. However, Wim Zwijneburg, who is an

expert on armed drones, confirmed that “the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable. But he confirmed the presence of a Chinese drone in the UAE military base in Assab”. However, later, various evidences were provided that show the UAE armed Ethiopian forces with drones (Plaut, 2022).

On June 10, 2021, African Confidences reported that “the UAE, which has been supplying weapons, money, and diplomatic support to Addis Ababa, seems to be changing tackle, cutting its association with the Ethiopian military after prodding from Washington (African Confidence, 2021). The UAE military base in Eritrea was closed in February 2021 (VOA news, 2021). This might be an indication of the limited involvement of the UAE in the later first phase of the northern conflict.

As cited, Plaut (2021), in the Tigray war and regional implication, from various sources, the aforementioned country supported Ethiopia in the northern war effort with military weapons, including drones and ambulances. The military logistics were exported through UAE airspace. Many flights were conducted between Ethiopia and the UAE at least two a day, especially during October, 2021.

4.1.6. The role of China in the northern Ethiopian conflict

As it has been mentioned in the UNSC diplomatic role section, China supported Ethiopia in the northern war effort in its veto power not to interfere external actors in internal issues of Ethiopia. Additionally, China helped Ethiopia with military weapons including drones, and personnel who gave training to Ethiopian forces in the use of drones. In October 2021, flights were tracked from Chengdu, in China, the place where Wing Loong I is made, to the air base Harar Meda in Ethiopia, as cited by Pult (2021).

4.2. What are the interests or motives of intervening actors in the Ethiopian conflict?

Due to the challenge of accurately identifying motives in interventions, it has been suggested that the primary indicators of interests lie in the political objectives of those who intervene (Sullivan & Koch, 2009). These objectives can be practically demonstrated through biased or neutral types of interventions, and they can also be inferred from the contextual factors surrounding the

intervention. In light of this viewpoint, the motives of Eritrea, the United States (US), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China, Turkey, Iran, and the African Union (AU) have been analyzed as follows:

4.2.1. The motives or interest of Eritrea intervention in the conflict in northern Ethiopia:

Eritrea did not show interest in the peace talks facilitated by the AU between the TPLF and Prime Minister Abiy. Eritrea provided training to the Amhara Special Forces during the conflict, who have been asserting their presence in western Tigray, near the border with Eritrea. This may be in the interest of Eritrea to creat a weakened and divided Ethiopia as advantageous to its own interests, potentially positioning itself as more influential than Ethiopia in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa (Hagose Gebremekael, 2022). This aligns with Brown's assertion that states intervene in internal conflicts by capitalizing on the internal turmoil of other nations, a type of intervention known as opportunistic intervention (Brown, 1996, p. 598). Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that Eritrea's intervention was not solely defensive but also opportunistic in nature.

Interview results with an IFA expert showed that the reason for Eritrea's alignment with the Ethiopian government is linked to security threats perceived by the TPLF. Eritrea considers the TPLF a threat to its own survival. In line with Brown's perspective on why neighboring states intervene in conflicts occurring near their borders, Eritrea's involvement in the conflict in the northern part of Ethiopia can be described as a defensive intervention. In addition, Eritrea seeks revenge on the leaders of the TPLF due to the crisis that arose during the war period of 1998-2008 between the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) and the Eritrean government (interview, on October 23, 2025). According to Brown (1996), on page 596-597 states that neighboring states often engage in "defensive interventions" in order to address cross-border challenges such as insecurity and refugee flows.

4.2.2. The motives, or interests of US intervention in the conflict in northern Ethiopia

According to WubegzeerFerede (Dr.) from (IFA), interview with ETV Dagu Amharic on the issue of “Foreign Intervention in Ethiopia” on October 19, 2022, stated, “The international actors as well as regional actors who threaten the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa would be changed. They attempt to refrain Ethiopia from its economic development and democratic

building," though, he didn't mention the actors. I expected that he meant to say US from international actors, and Egypt and Sudan from regional actors.

Interview results from IFA and EDS experts showed that, the official reason given for US intervention in Ethiopia's conflict was humanitarian aid, and human rights concern, but this is a pretext. The US has strategic interests in Ethiopia, particularly in terms of geopolitical dominance over the Horn of Africa. Also, the US is motivated to intervene in the northern Ethiopian conflict to use it as an opportunity to rebuild its international image, particularly at the Horn and the entire continent that previously declined during the Trump administration (interview, in October , 2023). Also, an interviewee from IFA added that the US and some of its Western allies, including the EU, did not trust the federal government of Ethiopia to protect their political and economic interests in the region with the growing influence of Russia, India, and particularly China in the Horn of Africa, as well as the wider continent of Africa. As a result, they decided to support the TPLF, a group that was more receptive to their influence, and with whom they could maintain a cooperative relationship (interview, October, 2023).

According to Cameron Hudson, the former US special envoy to Sudan, a significant change is occurring in the Horn of Africa that runs contrary to American interests, as pointed out by political economy analyst Freeman (Amco, 2021). So, the Biden administration needs a government in Ethiopia, either Abiy Ahmed, or the TPLF, or other coalition parties, but it must safeguard the US's political, economic, and security interests at the HOA and Ethiopia from the influence of China and others by running the course as well as the result of the northern part of the Ethiopian conflict.

4.2.3. Motives or interests of UNSC intervention in the conflict in northern Ethiopian

UN staffs, including the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, Political, and Peace building Affairs, as well as human rights groups and certain international leaders, have urged the Security Council to take more action concerning the situation in Ethiopia (Security Council Report, 2021). During council meetings, various issues were raised, but there was a general consensus among members regarding the security threat to the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia, the need for humanitarian aid delivery, the protection of civilians, and an end to the fighting (Council Report, 2021). However, their main difference lies in the approach they believe should be taken to address these issues.

Certain members, including Russia, China, India, and the A3 countries, believe that the issues in Ethiopia must be addressed in close coordination with the sovereign government and its leaders, adhering strictly to the fundamental guiding principles of United Nations humanitarian action. While the conflict has had a significant negative impact on the entire region, it is essential for stakeholders with influence in the Horn of Africa, as well as the media, to act responsibly and avoid escalating international rhetoric, thus refraining from exacerbating the already escalating interethnic tensions. The Security Council should provide the necessary time and space for the Ethiopian government, the African Union, and other relevant parties to address the situation (Security Council Meeting Record, 2021).

On the contrary, certain members, including the US, UK, and Ireland, emphasized that as the government of Ethiopia has not responded positively to the proposals put forth by council members, no progress has been made. They view the situation as an international threat, underscoring the need for the Security Council to address the issues at hand. However, due to this division among members, a consensus on the Tigray region has not been reached within the multilateral platform of the Security Council (Security Council, 2021). Interview results with an IFA expert stated that, Russia and China, with their veto power, gave political support to the Ethiopian government, because they have economic and political interests in the HOA, particularly in Ethiopia. Both countries have a need to counter the USA and its western allies interest in the HOA (interview, on October, 2023).

Generally, it can be concluded that the motivations behind the intervention of Security Council members, particularly those who possess veto powers, align with their shared political, economic, and security interests in the Horn of Africa. Their aim is to shape the course and outcome of the conflict by allowing and not allowing the intervention of the Security Council, according to their own national interests.

4.2.4. The motives or interests of AU intervention in the conflict in northern Ethiopian:

The AU intervened to mediate the conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the TPLF in the early stages of the war. However, their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the lack of acceptance by the Ethiopian government. The head of the AU Commission described Ethiopia's military operation in Tigray as legitimate (Blanchare, 2021). However, there have

been criticisms regarding the soundness of the AU's engagement in the Tigray conflict (Blanchare, 2021), p. 24.

Former Nigerian President, Obasanjo, requested Eritrea's participation in the peace talks, but Eritrea has not yet accepted the request. It is likely that President Isaias would refrain from entering into any deal with the TPLF (Hagose Gebreamlak, 2022). In contrast to the US and some others, including the TPLF, Obasanjo suggested negotiating without preconditions and sought to brief the Security Council meeting, emphasizing that the government of Ethiopia had popular support (UNSC meeting record, 2021). Additionally, Obasanjo credited the sixth general election of Ethiopia, held in June 2021, as fair, reliable, and peaceful. The perceived bias of the AU towards the government of Ethiopia by the US and the TPLF itself has raised concerns (Blanchare, 2021). Generally, the motive of the AU in the conflict was to resolve it in favor of the federal government.

4.2.5. The motives or interests of the UAE, Turkey, and Iran in the conflict in northern Ethiopian

Turkey has stated its interest in providing support for peace full resolution of the Tigray conflict. But it gives support to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. He made a military agreement with Erdogan on August 2021 (Brookings's institution, October 1, 2021). It is a part of the motive for influence in the red sea and the HOA that has been described as a "neo-Ottoman revival." The UAE's relationship with the HOA was its military base in the Eritrea port of Assab.

Interview results from IFA and EDS state that as other intervening countries after Abiy came to power, the political and economic interests of the UAE highly increased in Ethiopia. The personal relationship between Abiy and Mohamed Bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirate enable Abiy to acquire solid support during the conflict.

4.2.6. The motives or interests of China's intervention in the Conflict in northern Ethiopia

China has huge investment in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Access to the Red Sea is a strategic priority to China. It should not need to see the situation in Ethiopia blow up into a complex and protracted war that would affect its basic Horn policy and its maintenance military base in Djibouti (Brookings Institution, October 1, 2021). Interview results from IFA and EDS stated, China used Ethiopia to access the African economy, because Ethiopia is the gravity center for

Africa. So, China prefers to side with the federal government of Ethiopia over the TPLF. I believe that China following the enemy of my enemy's is my friend's strategy to protect its political and economic interests in Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

4.3. How the intervention of these external actors affect the course of northern Ethiopian conflict

4.3.1. The effect of Eritrean military intervention in the conflict in northern Ethiopia

Although, the study predominantly focused on the effects of direct military intervention that was done by Eritrea, other indirect military interventions of other states were also focused on which were done by other external actors. Effects of military intervention during the first phase of the conflict: During the first phase of the early period of the conflict, Eritrean military forces were involved in the conflict with Ethiopia, following the government's declaration of an offensive against Tigray forces on November 4, 2020 (Center for Preventive Action, 2022). After four weeks of intense convectional war, Ethiopian National Defense Forces and Eritrean troops subsequently entered the town on the evening of November 28, 2020. Prime Minister Abiy Ahimed declared that ENDF had taken control of Mekele, and the war had ended (Asylum Research Centre, 2021). At the start of the war, international media reported that the TPLF had possessed' militia and weaponry that most experts assessed as equivalent, or better than those of the federal army (Foreign Policy, 2021). However, the direct military intervention of Eritrea on the government' side, especially at the early phase of the conflict, helped bring about a quick end to the war, which made the duration of the conflict very short. This finding aligns with (Andorson's, 2019) study, which suggested that external military assistance on the part of the government reduces the duration of internal conflict, while the opposite holds true for rebels.

Although the conflict was officially declared over, clashes between TPLF forces and local militias, on one side, and ENDF and EDF, on the other side, continued guerilla warfare throughout December, January, and February (ACLED, 2021). During the latter period of the first phase of the conflict, before the announcement made by the Prime Minister on March 26, 2021, six brigades of the Eritrean force had returned from Tigray to Eritrea and carried out the bulk of the fighting and bore the brunt of casualties. By the end of March 2021, the entire composed of popular militias had returned to central Eritrea. A few are settled on the western

Eritrea and border area of Tigray Ethiopia, and they were attacked by Tigray militia, the other two brigades of 16 traveled from a large convey from an area of active fighting in the low land area of Tigray and arrived in Badme and Biyara, to support them (African Argument, 2021). This indicates that, since mid-March 2021, the level of involvement of Eritrea military forces in supporting the ENDF has significantly decreased from the earlier part of the first phase of this conflict.

On the other hand, the participation of the Eritrean military force alongside the federal government has galvanized the resistance of Tigray forces to intervention (ICG, 2021). This has further motivated them to continue the fight. Similarly, the role of Eritrean forces and the atrocities they committed appeared to have ignited Tigrayan support for the TPLF (Meses Tofa, Alagaw Ababu Kifle, and Kinkoh, 2022). Eventually, on June 28, 2021, Tigrayan forces regained control of Mekele, after seven months of battles in the surrounding countryside guerilla fighting (ACLED, 2021).

The withdrawal of most of the Eritrean forces from region of Tigray in mid-March, 2021 distorted the balance of capability between the TPLF and the federal government, as well as between the Tigrayan force and the ordinary population, which saw the Eritrean forces as an invader; this may have given advantage to the Tigray forces. Interview results with EDS and IFA experts stated that the involvement of the EDF in the Tigray war contributed to the high conflict intensity by increasing the capability of the Tigray forces to acquire support from Tigray people, Diasporas, and youth. Also, they [the interviewee] added the mishandling of Eritrean forces by the Tigray people, makes the war worse. It changed the type of warfare from guerilla to semi convectional war, and relatively, it prolonged the duration of the conflict to recapture the town of Mekelle by Tigray forces compared to the earlier phase of the first phase to control Mekelle by ENDF.

Effect of Eritrean military intervention during the second phase of the conflict: In July 2021, armed clashes erupted, signifying a new phase in the conflict's development as the TPLF advanced into the Amhara and Afar regions. This shift indicated a transformation in the TPLF's strategies, from insurgency tactics to a more formalized warfare approach. The Tigray Defense Forces utilized captured heavy weapons and made rapid advances along major transportation routes (ACLED 2021). Ethiopian and Eritrean troop withdrawal from most of Tigray except Western Tigray (Reuters, 2022). The TDF forces of the TPLF fought with the ENDF, the Amhara regional force, and afar regional forces (ACLED, 2021). In response to the TPLF's advances, the Ethiopian government declared the launch of a new offensive against the TDF in mid-July 2022. By the beginning of August, the TPLF continued to gain territory in the Amhara and Afar regions. They successfully took control of large swaths of land in the northern Wollo zone, including Gashena and Lalibella, as well as southern Gonder (ACLED 2021).

On August 23, 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinkon expressed concern about the re-entry of a large number of Eritrean defense forces into Ethiopia. These forces had previously withdrawn in June 2021 (Security Council Report, 2021). In late August 2021, the area under the control of EDF was significantly decreased and is now limited to the Ethio-Eritrea border and the Ethio-Sudan border (Ghent University 2021). During the expansion of the TPLF into Afar and Amhara, the involvement of Eritrean forces, supporting the ENDF, was restricted. They advanced from Assab to cut the logistics supply line of the TPLF via Mille, which lead to the hasty retreat of TPLF troops from hundreds of kilometers away in just a few days (Hagose Gebreamlak, 2022).

Tigray Defense Force, backed by foreign military personnel, engaged on the battle front in the second phase of the conflict held in the Amhara region (Wub Egizer, Ferede (Dr.), on Etv Dagu Amharic television on August 19, 2022). Interview results from EDS and IFA stated that international aid workers showed bias by providing satellite communication equipment to the Tigray forces, enabling them to monitor the movements of federal forces and obtain information (interview, in October, 2023). The World Food Program (WFP) and World Vision provide logistical support to the TPLF, an eyewitness resident from Dessie (Leyou, on December 8, 2021). According to the government of Ethiopia, many thousands of aid trucks that entered

Tigray were not return, which serve the TPLF to transport fighters and logistics (Abera Bekele, December 9, 2021).

As part of the new nature of war, conflicts fascinate actors in multiple contexts: Journalists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mercenaries, and military advisers are also new features of the war (Kaldor, 2012:5). Today's intervention in the conflict may not represent the only actors involved in hostilities in one way or another. The new wars are also characterized by regional states and organizations; these can be aid organizations and peacekeeping forces (Kaldor), 2012:5).

Between October18 and 22, 2021, the ENDF launched airstrikes in the Tigray region, marking the first round of such attacks by the government since it announced a unilateral ceasefire on June 28, 2021 (Borkerna, 2021). The following week, Ethiopia resumed air strikes in the Tigray region. The US State Department informed the Security Council that Iran had sent military drones to Ethiopia in 2021 with the claim that the US aligns with the Tigray rebel offensive that threatened to take the Ethiopian capital (The East Africa, 2022). The federal government has increasingly deployed internationally sourced drones, provided by the UAE, China, and Turkey, highlighting a new phase of international involvement in Ethiopia's war. Analysts have noted that the federal government of Ethiopia's use of foreign drones, which it denies, has played a significant role in pushing Tigray forces back north (UN-SCR, 2021).

Interview results with IFA and EDS showed that the federal government was supported military weapon by foreigners, such as Iran, Turkey, the UAE, and China. The federal government had a military agreement with Turkey before the war started (interview, in October, 2023).

The TDF was defeated in the Afar region and subsequently withdrawn by the government forces, on September 7, 2021. However, the Tigray forces countered this claim by stating that they had merely shifted troops to neighboring Amhara for offensives there (Insecurity Insight, 2021). On December 23, 2021, the Ethiopia government's Minister of Communication Service announced that all parts of eastern Amhara and the entire Afar state had been liberated from the occupation of the US-backed TPLF (Kulkarmi, 2021).

In any case, the balance of capability shifted from theTDF to the federal government forces. This leads to the conclusion that interventions by competitive actors biased towards both the

rebels and the government, increase the level of conflict as well as the duration of conflict compared to the first phase of the war. The finding of this study is aligned with the finding of Anderson's (2019) research, which posits that competitive intervention, defined as "two sided" at the same time as military assistance from different intervening states to both the government and the rebel combatants", prolongs civil war by distorting the bargaining process of internal combatants (Anderson, 2019), p. 692.

Effect of military intervention during the third phase of the conflict: The third phase of the northern Ethiopian conflict erupted on August 24, 2022, during a fight between Tigrayan forces and government forces around the town of Kobo, marking the end of a five-month-long ceasefire. The Tigry forces released their own statement, accusing the federal forces, as well as the Amhara special force, Wollo Fano, and militias, of launching a military attack in several areas , including ChobeBer, Janora, Yalo, Alamata, Bala, and BisoBer (Addis Standard, September 12, 2022). The federal government blamed Tigrayan forces for the resumption of the militarized hostilities. The TPLF, however, denied thess claims. Before the war resumed, on August 22, 2022, the TPLF had rejected the AU's mediation role and called for Western interference (African Report, 2022).

As it was mentioned earlier in the second phase of the conflict, Eritrean involvement was restricted. Even though, since mid-September 2022, there have been reports of military mobilization in Eritrea along the northern border of Tigray (Security Council Report, 2022).

The Tigray force occupied many areas of northern Wollo. According to Alex de Waal, 2022, Tigray forces captured a significant arsenal from the federal army in last year's fighting, and there are rumors that they had also acquired new weapons from abroad (BBC, 2022). According to LeGen. Yielma Merdasa stated, "On the day the fighting started in the south, the federal air force had shot down a plane the previous evening. The plane was allegedly coming from Sudanese air space to deliver weapons to Tigray" (Fana Broadcasting, 2022). Though, it was denied by TPLF. While no independent source has verified that the plane was really carrying arms, it is worth nothing that Tigray has previously received other undisclosed air deliveries, which the Ethiopian government believes to be lethal aid (International crisis Group, 2022).

According to Wub Egizer Ferede's (Dr.) interview in the TV Dagu Amharic language, on October 19, 2022), "foreign actors had sent military weapons to the TPLF and also recruited and trained fighters from refugee camps." Interview results with EDS and IFA experts stated that TPLF received weapons, most probably from the US through Sudan air space. I believed the TPLF was the start of the third phase of the war. There are premises that lead to this conclusion. On August 26, 2022, the Ethiopian air force bombed Mekele, allegedly resulting in civilian casualties when the strike hit a play ground (UNSCR, 2022).

I need to react to the delivery of weapons to the TPLF and the shot down of the plan by the Ethiopian Air Force. Whatever the effect was, the Sudanese army attacked the Ethiopia's troops in the Al-fashago area on June 28, 2022, following the killing of Sudanese soldiers on June 22, 2022 (Al-monitor, 2022). Sudan confirmed that the plane was shot down, but it was on its territory, and then Sudan accused Ethiopia to the UNSC of violating its territory, though noting that it happened. So, I believed that, the TPLF received weapons from abroad, they may be from America. But the plan did not shut down by Ethiopian air forces either in Ethiopia or in Sudanese territory, but Sudan used it to condemn Ethiopia as violent in the eyes of the international community. Also, Ethiopia used it to tell Sudan and others not to support the TPLF. This might be the US's plan for a proxy war on Ethiopia, through Sudan and other regional countries. The US special envoy to the Horn of Africa traveled to Khartoum in January, 2022, it might be to discuss the Ethiopian conflict, and then he visited Addis Ababa (US State Department, 2022).

4.3.2. The effect of UN-Security Council intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopia

Effects of UNSC diplomatic intervention during the first phase of the conflict: During the time of northern Ethiopia conflict, the United Nations Security Council held fourteen rounds of meetings; only two of those were open meetings, and the rest were held under Any Other Business (AOB) (Security Council Report, 2022).

Two of these open meetings have been analyzed for the purpose of this study. The first meeting has been held, on July 2, 2021, on the "Peace and Security in Africa'' agenda on the situation of the Tigray region of Ethiopia. This meeting followed the announcement of the ceasefire by the federal government of Ethiopia on June 28, 2021. Council members are likely to welcome the announcement of the ceasefire as a positive development during the meeting. The members who requested the meeting saw this development as a window of opportunity to hold an open session

of the council to address the issue. They deemed it necessary for the council to publicly call for an end to the violence, advocate for a sustained and negotiated ceasefire, and promote an inclusive dialogue to address the situation.

During the meeting, the representative from the United States, raised, concerns about "the Ethiopian force looting the office of the humanitarian organization and destroying communication equipment, and the bridge when they retreated from Mekele, and emphasized the need to return all the equipment that has been looted. If such acts have been done, these indicate a breach of the humanitarian ceasefire and resemble a siege" (Security Council meeting record, 2021). This implies that the withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defense Force from Mekele was followed by their defeat by the Tigray militia forces. Additionally, it state that the United States did not acknowledge the ceasefire declared by the Ethiopian government.

Three days prior to the Security Council meeting, on June 29, 2021, TDF dismissed the ceasefire as a "joke" and vowed to intensify the struggle'' until enemies completely leave Tigray (ICG, 2021). In her briefing to the council, Di Carlo, the Under –Secretary-General for Political and Peace building Affairs, stated that as of that day, the TPLF had not agreed to respect the ceasefire declared by the government (Security Council meeting record, 2021). However, there were no explicit warnings or demands made to the TPLF to adhere to the ceasefire.

On the contrary, other council members, such as China and Russia, hold the view that, however, they appear to be of the view that Ethiopia should be given space and time to build upon and consolidate the ceasefire declaration and address the situation internally. They acknowledged the government's efforts and called for all opposing sides to demonstrate them. They also opposed interference from the Security Council in resolving the issues, as it would be counterproductive, destabilize the situation, and weaken the political position of federal authorities (SCR, 2021).

Effects of UNSC during the second phase of the conflict: In July 2021, a week after a meeting of the Security Council, armed clashes erupted between the federal government and TDF, spreading into the Amhara and Afar regions (ACLED, 2021). These clashes lasted for almost seven months. Some members of the council, like the US and its western allies, sided with the TPLF,

while others, such as Russia and China, sided with the federal government of Ethiopia. This division in support is driven by the political motives or interests of the two rival powers: the US and its western allies on one side, and Russia and China on the other. Their intervention in the Ethiopian conflict is related to their geopolitical dominance over the Horn of Africa. Both sides have tried to shape the course and outcome of the war according to their interests.

The second meeting was held on November 8, 2021, under the agenda of "peace and security in Africa''. This meeting followed the declaration of a state emergency on November 2, 2021, and reports of the TPLF's advance toward the center of Ethiopia. Some council members, especially those from the US, UK, France, and Ireland, mainly focused on earlier events of the conflict that occurred in the Tigray region. These members raised concerns about the gap in the joint investigation team report, the need for accountability, an immediate ceasefire, and negotiations.

These council members, particularly the United States, also expressed opposition to the declared state of emergency, as stated by Mrs. Thomas-Greenfield, the US representative: "We will do everything in our power to keep their people safe." In general, they favored resolving the conflict through the action of the Security Council, showing a bias towards the TPLF. This bias may be attributed to the fact that the conflict had expanded beyond the Tigray region; during that time, humanitarian aid delivery in Tigray had improved compared to earlier phases.

Others members of the Council, especially Russia and China, focused on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Amhara and Afar regions due to the recent conflict that has been going on there or during the time of the meeting. These members believed that the Security Council should give space and time for Ethiopian and AU efforts to address the situation. In the end, the members of the Security Council expressed full support for intervening and ending the conflict through AU efforts. Obasanjo requested the council to encourage the federal government and TPLF to engage in political dialogue without preconditions. However, the competitive diplomatic interventions driven by motives between different actors have increased the duration of the conflict. This finding aligns most closely with the research by Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005), who found that rival interventions can significantly prolong the duration of civil war. All of them have been unable to agree on the Tigray situation. This might be due to Russia and China, which have blocked efforts to put Ethiopia on the council's formal agenda while respecting Ethiopia and its leadership' sovereignty. Interview results from EDS

stated that, the stance or sign of some members of the UNSC became an appetite for the TPLF to continue the fight due to the expectation that the Security Council could pass a resolution for military intervention. During this phase, from September 1-15, 2021 through a period of two weeks of about 40 armed clashes between Tigray forces and ENDF, without backing Eritrean forces, nearly 400 fatalities were recorded, and within five days, about 120 people died (ACLED, October 2021). This showed that, there was a high intensity of conflict.

The other organ of UN which intervened in the conflict was UN humanitarian aid office. Its intervention had effect on the course of the conflict. The explicit work of the staff in the conflict of northern Ethiopia was to assist the humanitarian aid. However, it was problematic. In early February 2021, the WFP Executive Director visited Tigaray and backed to Addis Ababa, along with the Ethiopian Ministry of Peace and UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Soon, a sign of a recent battle was observed in the region. Following the visit, a thousand tons of foods were transported to Tigray (Omamo, 2022, p. 31).

On March 23, 2021, the Ethiopian government requested support and signed an agreement with WFP Ethiopia to deliver aid to Tigray. However, in late March, WFP announced that it would expand its operation in Tigray without a formal request. Following this, the government rejected the way the aid would be delivered. This created tension between the federal government of Ethiopia and the international community (Omamo, 2022, p.33).

The month of March was the time when the major events took place. For example, Prime Minister Abiy Ahimed, for the first time, admitted publicly to the international community the presence of Eritrea in the conflict. This attracted more international actors to intervene in the conflict, which in turn encouraged the TPLF to fight further outside the region. On March 18, 2021, Tigrayan forces staged a deadly attack inside the Amhara region (ICG, April 2, 2021).

During the second phase of the conflict, in July 2021, the government suspended the Dutch Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), accusing the groups of spreading false information, violating work permits, and using unauthorized satellite communications apparatus, though the UN rejected it (Moss and Kurtzer, 2021). Omamo reported that “a special envoy from the global power traveled to Mekele, Dessie, Kombolcha, and Afar in September 2021. He only spoke and tweeted about Mekele without reference to

Dessie. He said nothing about the debilitating effect of the TPLF incursion into Amhara and Afar on the humanitarian operation in Tigray. He was terribly imperfect and biased" (Omamo, 2022, p.45).

On September 30, 2021, Ethiopia expelled seven UN officials, accusing them of interfering in Ethiopia's internal affairs. Following this, Guterese condemned the expulsions as a violation of Ethiopia's commitment under the UN Charter and a fundamental principle of international public service (UNSCR, 2021). This could be confirmed by kaldor; today's intervention in the conflict may not represent the only actors involved in hostilities in one way or another. The new wars are also characterized by regional states and organizations; these could be aid organizations and peacekeeping forces (Kaldor, 2012:5). In sum, aid organizations and their workers were involved in the Ethiopian conflict. They may not have all, but were biased to TPLF. As they intervened or visited Mekele, soon something would happen that would influence the course and outcome of the conflict.

On the eve of the third phase of the conflict, on August 20, 2022, the World Food Program accused the federal government of restricting the amount of fuel to distribute humanitarian aid. However, the same source reported, on August 24, Stephane Dujarric, Chief Spokesperson for UN Secretary- General. Saied, "WFP-warehouse in Mekelle, was forcibly entered by Tigray forces, who took 12 full fuel trucks and tankers with 570,000 liters of fuel'' (African Mirror, 2022). This indicates how humanitarian aid became politicized.

4.3.3. The effect of US diplomatic intervention on the course of the conflict

Effect of US intervention during the first phase of the conflict: The United States has provided diplomatic support to Tigray. The US could not resolve the Tigray situation based on the approach, as its' need in UNSC platforms due to objections from Russia and China, which possess veto power. As a result, the US sought alternative options to address the situation in Tigray and increase pressure on Ethiopia and Eritrea through both unilateral and multilateral platforms. Some of the unilateral actions taken by US included labeling the government's actions as "ethnic cleansing." During a Security Council meeting, Mr. Thomas-Greenfield, the US representative, emphasized "the importance of the region's Tigray people hearing their voice and knowing that they have not been forgotten, also sent a message to the involved parties that

their actions are being monitored. There might be a need for negotiation, suggesting the potential for changes to Ethiopia's internal and external borders through force" (UNSC meeting record, 2021).

Such kind of intervention, which took sides, not only discourage the resolution of the conflict from ending but also potentially contribute to pressuring for secession, from the perspective of Tigray Defense Forces. It can be remembered how Eritrea separated from Ethiopia territory.

Additionally, the US organized an open "US-EU high-level roundtable" on June 10, 2021, which took place on the eve of the G7 summit. Following this discussion, the EU passed a resolution in order to address the situation in Tigray, imposed on the Ethiopian government as well as Eritrea. Seventeen days later, on June 28, 2021, the Tigray Defense Force entered Mekele. As a result, the conflict lasted for about seven months, which is relatively longer compared to the earlier period of the conflicts in the first phase. This result is supported by the findings of Regan (2002) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), who observed that intervention generally leads to a longer duration of civil wars.

Effect of US diplomatic intervention during the second phase of the conflict: During this phase of the conflict, the war was expanding its scope as well as its conflict level. At its early stage, when the TPLF advanced to the central part of Amhara and Afar, the US was busy imposing unilateral sanctions on the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. Simultaneously, they pressurized in order to organize anti-government parties in Washington to establish a transitional government in Ethiopia. The Oromo Liberation Army helped the TPLF on the battle field, but the US said nothing. They warned their citizens not to go to Ethiopia.

On December 20, 2021, the TPLF called for the international community to force the government into negotiations and impose an arms embargo on the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments, as well as further urge the imposition of a no-fly zone over Tigray (Kulkarmi, 2021). This was a day the twelfth Security Council meeting was held. This is an indication, of TPLF's expecting to adopt resolutions by UNSC or the need for UNSC intervention. All this motivates Tigrayan forces not to stop the fight, which in turn prolongs the duration of the conflict as well as its scope.

Following this, the Ethiopian government released prisoners of the war, including TPLF leaders on January 1, 2022, under the pressure of President Biden. Whether it was deliberated or no,t the event was linked to the day with Ethiopian diasporas came to Ethiopia for celebration, which created a gap between the government and the diasporas. On other hand, it made the TPLF supported Diasporas influential in world politics (interview, in October, 2023).

In mid- January 2022, the new US special envoy for the Horn of Africa, David Satterfield, and Department of State Assistant Secretary Molly Phee went to Riyadh, Khartoum, and Addis Ababa to encourage government officials to seize the current opening for peace by ending the air strikes and other hostilities, negotiating a ceasefire, releasing all political prisoners, restoring sustained humanitarian access, and laying the foundation for an inclusive national dialogue. As reported in a January 19, 2022, statement by the Secretary-General, Obasanjo expressed "optimism" that there is now a real opportunity for political and diplomatic resolution of the conflict. On January 24, 2022, following their visit to Addis Ababa, Satterfieid went to Nairobi for a meeting with Kenyatta. According to a statement issued by Kenyatta, the US and Kenya agreed to continue engaging the conflicting parties in Ethiopia with the aim of reaching a swift resolution to the conflict. After the defeat of the TPLF military victory, the US seems to prefer to engage with the government for negotiations rather than push for a military solution.

During the months of January and March 2022, positive measures, such as a unilateral truce to allow aid, facilitate daily humanitarian flights, and lift the state of emergency, were taken by the federal government. Also, Tigrayan forces said they will respect a ceasefire if sufficient aid is delivered to their region "within a reasonable time.'' This was followed, by the coming of the above mentioned US high officials. However, Satterfieid left the position of his special envoys of HOA to the US; the reason was not known. In my view, he worked his responsibility in right way, but it was not matched to the US government, so, he was shifted from his position.

Before the beginning of the third phase of the conflict, on July 28, 2022, Rediwan Husein tweeted his government's readiness for peace talks "anytime, anywhere" and "without precondition." In early August 2022, special envoys from the US,UN, EU, and Horn of Africa, as well as Ambassadors to the US, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, engaged in discussions with Ethiopia and reached an agreement. The Ethiopian government stated that it was ready to engage in talks without preconditions.

On August 2, 2022, the same diplomats were granted permission for a round-trip to Mekele and met with the TPLF's leader. This visit marked the first high-level visit by western countries to Mekele. On the same day, the envoys released a statement announcing their agreement on the importance of swiftly restoring social services, as previously recognized in their discussions with the Ethiopian government.

On August 4, 2022, the Ethiopian government expressed its complaint, regarding what it perceived as the handling of the matter in Mekelle by the team of envoys and ambassadors. The federal government further accused the high level western diplomats of falling to the press for an unequivocal commitment to peace talks, instead indulging in appeasement and fulfilling preconditions set by the TPLF. The diplomats nothing said that Ethiopia's complaint. So, this indicated that the diplomats shared or encourages or initiate the ideas of TPLF rather than the federal government.

Effects of US diplomatic intervention during the third phase of the conflict: On August 22, 2022, the AU's credibility and relevance were dismissed by the TPLF, which called for Western intervention (African Report, 2022). The following day, on the eve of the third phase of the conflict, on August 23, 2022, the TPLF penned an open letter to the international community, demanding that the federal authorities to restore the social services in Tigray and to return western Tigray to their control. Finally, on August 24, 2022, fighting broke out between Tigrayan forces and government forces near the town of Kobo, abruptly ending a five-month long ceasefire. Bothe sides blame each other for initiating the conflict (Waal, 2022).

So, this demonstrates that the diplomatic intervention of the US as well as its western allies was focused on pushing both the government and the TPLF towards a mutually hurting stalemate, rather than supporting them to seek a mutually beneficial dispute settlement. This action not only prolonged the duration of the conflict but also, became a cause or sponsor to ignite the third phase of the conflict or other conflict. The findings of Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) support this conclusion, as they argue that expectations of aid from state rivals can motivate warring parties to continue fighting, such expectations significantly decrease the likelihood of reaching a peaceful settlement (p. 367).

4.3.4. The effect of the AU diplomatic intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopia

On November 24, 2020, the Chairman of the AU, Cyril Ramaphosa, deployed three former African heads of state to Addis Ababa with the aim of resolving the crisis. However, Blanchare, (as cited in Shewit woldemicaeal, 2021) Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rejected their offer of mediation, as stated by Additionally, in December 2020, the head of the AU Commission, Mussa Faki, described the Ethiopia's military operation in Tigray as legitimate, but expressed concern about the human suffering taking place in the region. According to the same source, in March, 2021, Faki and the Ethiopian foreign affairs minister agreed, to have the African Commission on Human' Rights (ACHPR) conduct an investigation into human rights abuses in Tigray. However, when the commission of inquiry was launched in June 2021, the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister declared it to be outside the scope of the government's invitation (Blanchard, 2021). The presence of a long-standing relationship between the AU and TPLF as well as the AU and the federal government of Ethiopia had a negative impact on the acceptance of the AU's mediation request, which both the TPLF and the federal government rejected, especially at the early stages of the conflict. The findings of (Abdelrahman and Lee, 2016) support this conclusion, as they argue historical ties to the mediator actually decrease the likelihood of offer acceptance.

The federal government of Ethiopia declared a unilateral ceasefire, following the withdrawal of its troops from the Tigray region, Mekele, on June 28, 2021. However, the Tigray defense force rejected and continued to engage in fighting against forces including, ENDF, ASF, Afar Special Force, and Amhara Fano fighters, in the regions of Afar and Amhara in early July 2021. This marked the beginning of the second phase of the conflict. At the end of July 2021, TDF released two lists of preconditions for a mutual ceasefire negotiation (ACLED, 2021). AU said nothing on the matter.

Olesegun Obasanjo was appointed as the High-Representatives special envoy for horn of Africa on August 26, 2021. He reattempted AU's previously unsuccessful mediation efforts. Obasanjo was invited to present a brief at the Security Council open meeting on November 8, 2021, for the first time. He stated that yesterday, there were a large number of people demonstrated in Addis Ababa and other cities in support of the government, which is evidence of the current reality. He further added that both the government and TPLF individually acknowledge that their

differences are political in nature and require a political solution. He emphasized that there is a small window of opportunity for this (Security Council Meeting Record 2021).

Lastly, Obasanjo requested the UN Security Council encourage the parties involved to engage in political dialogue without any preconditions and to immediately and unconditionally cease hostilities. He also called upon the international community to support the AU-led process in order to ensure coherence and unity of purpose in our peacemaking efforts in HOA, specifically in Ethiopia. The Security Council reiterated its support for the AU's intervention and efforts to halt the conflict (Council meeting record, 2021). This was a time of heavy fighting between the Tigray defense force and government forces in the regions' of Amhara and Afar.

Despite, diplomatic initiatives by Obasanjo, no progress were made toward initiating ceasefire talks between the parties. When Tigray force faced military defeat the TPF announced that they would withdraw to the border of Tigray and declared an immediate cessation of hostilities on December 19, 2021. After a day, Gebremicael appealed to the international community in quotation marks to pressure the Ethiopian government into negotiations and impose an arms embargo on both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Furthermore, he strongly urged the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Tigray region. On the same day, the twelfth meeting of the Security Council was held. This indicates that the TPLF had hoped for a resolution to be adopted by the UNSC.

From January 17 to January 20, 2022, David Satterfieid, the newly appointed US special envoy for HOA, along with, Molly Phee, Assistant Secretary from the Department of State, traveled to Riyadh, Khartoum, and Addis Ababa. Their objective was to encourage government officials to seize the current opportunity for peace by halting airstrikes and other hostilities, engaging in ceasefire negotiations, releasing political prisoners, ensuring sustained humanitarian access, and laying the foundation for an inclusive national dialogue. On January 24, 2022, following their visit to Addis Ababa, David Satterfieid & Molly Phee traveled to Nairobi to meet with Kenyatta, release a statement issued by Kenya. The US and Kenya agreed to continue engaging the conflicting parties in Ethiopia with the aim of expediting a swift resolution to the conflict. Obasanjo did not participate there.

During the months of January and March, several positive measures were taken by the federal government. These measures included the release of prisoners, the declaration of a unilateral

truce to allow aid, facilitation of daily humanitarian flights, and the lifting of the state of emergency. In response, the TDF stated that they would respect a ceasefire if sufficient aid was delivered to their region within a reasonable time. However, these developments were interrupted when David Satterfieid was removed from his position. These circumstances serve as evidence that the AU lacks the necessary mediating power, both in soft and hard power. The mediator's power and resources are crucial when mediating belligerence, especially when either of the parties views the mediator as lacking credibility or honesty. This finding might be supported by the findings of Greig and Regan (2008), who underline the importance of resources allocated by the mediators. They asserted that major powers, with their superior resources available for diplomatic processes, played a vital role in achieving success in their mediation efforts.

Leaders of the TPLF may have been motivated by the call of members of the Security Council meeting and the circulation of a draft presidential statement by Ireland on April 1, 2022. Additionally, Gutereses' press statement on April 6, 2022, calling for swift restoration of public services in the Tigray region, may have influenced their decision. Because these actions addressed one of the two preconditions previously set by TPLF. Leaders of Tigray announced the withdrawal of their force from Erebti, in the Afar region, expressing their expectation of immediate improvements in humanitarian access on April 12, 2022. Remarkably, this happened two days prior to the Security Council meeting. Moreover, in early June 2022, the leadership of Tigray released a statement expressing willingness to participate in a credible, impartial, and principled peace process. However, in an open letter, the Tigray regional government raised concerns about the perceived closeness between Obasanjo and Abiy Ahmed on 13, June 2022 (Zekarias Beshah Abebe, 2022).

On the contrary, the federal government has formed a committee to negotiate with Tigrayan forces, a public step towards peace talks. The government has tweeted its' readiness for peace talk anytime and anywhere without precondition on 28 July 2022. When things are like this, US, EU, UN envoys for horn of Africa and ambassadors of its allies had a discussion with the government of Ethiopia in early August 2022. They agreed to talk peace without preconditions (Addis standard news, 2022). Obasanjo may not be included in include on the discussion.

On August 2, 2022, the envoys took permission to travel to Mekelle, where they met the authorities of Tigray, and released the statement as they reached a consensus that a swift restoration of social service was necessary, as recognized in earlier discussions with the Ethiopian government (Zekarias, 2022). Obasanjo was not included in their discussion. However, seven months, when Obasanjo requested the Security Council encourage both parties to talk without preconditions (Security Council Record, 2021). This was accepted by all members of the Security Council, which was held on November 8, 2021, at an open meeting, including the US. This may be a reason for Obasanjo not to participate in both the Addis Ababa and Mekelle meetings.

Finally, on August 22, 2022, TPLF rejected the AU's credibility and relevance and called for Western intervention (towards freedom 2022). Two days later, the third phase of the conflict started. The interference of the US and its western allies, rather than supporting the mandate of the AU- led mediation process, has prolonged the duration of terminating the conflict.

On September 11, 2022, Tigrayan authorities committed to engage in negotiations led by the AU and observed by the UN. Peace talks. This commitment aligned with the earlier public commitment made by the federal government but failed to blunt escalatory momentum. AU-brokered peace talks were initially planned to take place on October 8, 2022 in South Africa and were to be facilitated by an expanded team of mediators led by Obasanjo, supported by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, and former South Africa Deputy president and former Under-Secretary-General and UN Woman Executive Director Phumizil Mlambo-Ngcuka.

However, due to a technical problem, it was postponed to October 24, 2022, and lasted until November 2, 2022. Ultimately, it brought peace and ended the conflict between the TPLF and the federal government of Ethiopia. This may have addressed the threat raised by the TPLF regarding the credibility of the mediator, as well as the federal government's need to talk without preconditions. This study finding is in line with the study by Zartman (1985), which suggests that the disputants are most likely to accept mediation and cooperate for conflict resolution only after certain conditions are met.

4.3.5. The effect of the UAE, Turkey, and Iran's intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopia:

Kaldor argues that the process of globalization contributes to the new wars; therefore, today's wars are characterized by global modernity, because new materials and technologies are used. New technologies and modern military equipment, such as drones, robots, and computers, as well as modern means of communication, allow actors to reduce their casualties.

However, new wars are characterized by modern war characters, and intervention using these modern technologies turns out to be clumsy in bringing those anticipated effects to the ground. For example, the use of drones as some of the most sophisticated war equipment has become counterproductive in some conflicts. Kaldor explained that in some cases, the technology may have a positive impact on warfare, but not in most cases (Kaldor, 2012:4). The impact of the drones on the war's course is not likely to be known for some time. Aljazeera concludes that drones were critical in tipping the conflict towards the Ethiopia government (Aljazeera, Dec. 10, 2021).

4.3.6. The effect of China's intervention in the conflict of northern Ethiopia

China has provided political and military support to Prime Minister Abiy. The intervention of China is based on the geopolitical and economic interests that it has at the HOA and the entire continent, particularly in Ethiopia. China is the dominant competence of the United States at the HOA. The main reason that the United States declared a hybrid war on Ethiopia was its close relationship with China through which it fears to lose its interests (Korybko, 2022). So, to counter the war on Ethiopia or its interest, China was motivated to support Ethiopia. China was the biggest provider of drones and other military equipment for the northern Ethiopian war effort. Analysts point to the use of Chinese drones as an effort to tide the conflict towards Abiy Ahmed. This was mainly seen during the second phase of the conflict. The rise of Chinese influence and interest in the continent is a factor in the failure of peace efforts in Ethiopia. So this competitive hybrid intervention, driven by motives of self-interests, prolonged the duration and the intensity of the conflict.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. Conclusion

This study explores the effect of external intervention on the northern part of the Ethiopian conflict and the roles of the involved external actors, political motives, and how their intervention in the conflict and a peace process affected the overall course of the conflict since November 4, 2020_November 2022. In order to answer the study questions, a qualitative approach method was employed; semi-structured interviews and document reviews were used. Accordingly, the study found that the intervening regional and international actors' role and interest in this conflict is necessitated by their national security threats posed by the Ethiopian conflict and its impact on HOA. This confirms Brown's assertion that an internal conflict becomes an international issue when it crosses its borders and poses a threat to international peace and security (Brown, 1996).

However, much of the role of the intervened actors in the peace process and ending the ceasefire did not align with the assumed outcome. Intervention can typically occur through military, diplomatic, and economic means, and these avenues can significantly impact the course and the outcome of the conflict. In this study, the focus is on the effects of military and diplomatic intervention. The direct military intervention by Eritrea on the side of the government, especially at the early phase of the conflict, enables the conflict to end quickly, which makes the duration of the conflict very short. In direct military bias toward to both the rebels and the government from others competitive actors' interventions both the level of conflict and the duration of conflict increase relatively to the first phase of the war. It influenced the type of warfare, from convectional to guerilla to convectional.

Competitive diplomatic and military or hybrid intervention driven by motives of self interest also prolonged the duration of the conflict as well as intensity of the conflict. The US as well as its western allies diplomatic interventions were, pushing the warring to reach a mutually hurting stalemate, rather than supporting them to seek a mutually beneficial dispute settlement. This

action not only prolong the duration of the conflict but also becames a cause or sponsor to erupt the last or others phase of the conflict, Interference on others process mediation role also increase the duration of the conflict. The effectiveness of mediation also depends up on the power of the mediators. The characteristic of the parties goals and motive, intensify by external actors, especially if it is ethnic based conflict, may lead to secession.

In sum up, the intervener actors play their role both covertly and overtly. Their motive to intervene is for the sake of national interest but they are differing in their approach they followed. Also, their role affect the course of the conflict by distorting the initial military, diplomatic, and economic capability of the warring parties and has effect on the duration of civil war, the level/ intensity of intra-state conflict, the types of warfare, and the outcome of the conflict.

5.2. Recommendation

Ethiopia and other African states, especially countries of HOA, are better at solving internal conflict, particularly ethnic based conflict, though home grown conflict resolving mechanisms.

External intervention is an inevitable phenomenon. So, it should be managed carefully, that is, by making good foreign relations diplomacy, unless it leads to the fate of the state and its people's livelihoods being endangered.

The federal government of Ethiopia should follow careful diplomacy that suits the dynamic of current world politics.

The federal government of Ethiopia should choose the **"golden mean''** position between the US and its western partners with China, Russia, and others who have an interest in the HOA, and it's as the previous TPLF-led EFDRE.

The government of Ethiopia shall enhance the role of media diplomacy in order to curb misinformation or disinformation disseminated by others.

The interveners should know the reality of the issues that disseminated misinformation or disinformation by the international media and individuals' motivation. This study focuses on effects of intervention on the course of the war, it is better to study evaluating the peace talks held in Pretoria.

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
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7. APPENDIX

Appendix-A



Map 1: Conflict location and battle front line in early phase of the conflict